How the United States Would Fight China
The Risks of Pursuing a Rapid Victory
Assesses the substantial risk of strategic defeat for Washington in any war with China.
Description
This is a detailed analysis of how the United States intends to fight a war against the People’s Republic of China and why it risks strategic defeat—based on its doctrine, force structure and general ‘way of war’. Franz-Stefan Gady contends that the US military’s current approach to a potential war over Taiwan is flawed, relying heavily both on achieving rapid information superiority and on a decisive victory. This is unlikely to succeed, and may increase the risk of nuclear escalation between the world’s only genuine superpowers.
A US–China war would more likely be characterised by prolonged attrition across multiple domains (cyber, space, air, sea and land)—a conflict for which America’s military and society are ill-prepared. The US also lacks a viable blueprint, the military forces or the industrial capacity for a long war of attrition. This deficiency stems from a military culture prioritising advanced technology over mass, and the lack of political will or public readiness for the sacrifices such a conflict would require.
Gady’s research and analysis, both of the highest order, reveal the significant risk of strategic defeat for the United States in a potential conflict with China, whether in the 2020s or 2030s.
Reviews
‘Carefully reasoned and exhaustively researched, this book demonstrates the daunting operational, organisational and political challenges that the US would face should it go to war with China over Taiwan. Uncomfortable but essential reading.’ — Lawrence Freedman, Emeritus Professor of War Studies, King’s College London
‘Gady poses important questions about what American and Chinese theories of success for a Taiwan campaign might be, against the context of two different cultures of war. An essential text on the conceptual underpinnings of deterring such a war—and, if necessary, winning it.’ — Mick Ryan, Retired Major-General, Australian Army, and Adjunct Fellow, Center for Strategic and International Studies
‘A much-needed and timely addition to the growing body of literature on a potential Taiwan conflict. This book addresses the urgent need to reconsider how to understand the potential for nuclear escalation and protracted conflict, and ultimately how to strengthen deterrence in the Indo-Pacific.’ — Meia Nouwens, Senior Fellow for Chinese Security and Defence Policy, International Institute for Strategic Studies
‘Essential reading for US defence planners and strategists, or anyone interested in a potential war over Taiwan. Gady explains why American and Chinese operational concepts aiming to win a short, sharp war are flawed—and likely to increase the risks of escalation and a protracted attritional conflict.’ — Stacie Pettyjohn, Director of the Defense Program, Center for a New American Security
Author(s)
Franz-Stefan Gady has advised US and European militaries on structural reform and the future of high-intensity warfare. An adjunct senior fellow with the Center for a New American Security, Washington, DC, he has conducted field research in Afghanistan, Iraq and Ukraine. His latest book is The Return of War.